Common Sense Atheism - Latest Comments in The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 22:32:02 -0000

Yeah, DISQUS is being ridiculous. I'm trying to find a way out without losing all the comments.

About desire utilitarianism, the way I like to say it is that much of the theory is semantic and much of it is ontological. Many parts of the theory are about what people seem to mean when they use moral terms. Other parts of the theory are about what happens if we look for referents to what people mean in the real universe.

For example, when people talk about morality, they seem to be talking about objectively existing reasons for action. That's a semantic issue. Now, what kinds of things are found in the set "reasons for action"? God's will? Categorical imperatives? Intrinsic values? As it happens, the only things in the set that actually exists are desires. That's an ontological claim.

Anyway, I haven't addressed your criticisms very well here, but I will touch on them more thoroughly in later posts. I can't spend all my time responding to comments, or else I won't have any time to write new posts! But I do appreciate you pursuing this discussion as I far as I was able in this thread.

I suppose it feels like I'm running away from your questions, but I'd really like to address these very important objections in full, more carefully prepared blog posts, and that takes some time.

I have a vested interest in answering these questions not so much because I want "my theory" to succeed, but because if I am wrong I don't want to keep wasting my time on desire utilitarianism. So if I keep writing out the answers to these questions and I find a legitimate flaw that cannot be fixed, then I will let go of desire utilitarianism and give a big thanks to everyone who helped point out its flaws.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

toweltowel — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 22:04:07 -0000

1. "'For Lisa to not be poisoned, she SHOULD not drink poison.' This is a true statement that is not well explained without reference to normative facts."

That may or may not be a true statement, but it certainly does not appear to be a statement fit for empirical investigation. Are you perhaps thinking of the causal claim, "Lisa cannot avoid being poisoned if she drinks poison"? This latter claim is indeed empirical, but it is quite different from the above 'should' claim. So there still seems to be no empirical gain in positing normative facts.

2. "What else would 'normative' mean?" Well, something more than a nihilist would accept. And even a nihilist could accept that human animals have attitudes. Normativity is supposed to be something more, about what is appropriate.

3. On "desire utilitarianism", perhaps we are talking past each other. Consider the following two distinct claims:

A: Reasons for actions are grounded entirely in desires, goodness is grounded entirely in a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is grounded entirely in an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.

B: Reasons for action, goodness, and rightness are to be identified with their naturalistic supervenience base.

I thought "desire utilitarianism" referred only to the ethical theory A. And A does not entail the metaethical theory B, and as such is clearly compatible with metaethical non-naturalism.

But I now gather that you use "desire utilitarianism" to refer to the combination of A and B:

C: Reasons for actions are identical with desires, goodness is identical with a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is identical with an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.

That's fine, I suppose, so long as it is recognized that C is a combination of two distinct theories, one ethical and one metaethical. And so the point remains that a desire-based account of reasons of action has no special advantage when it comes to all the old metaethical questions.

P. S. Sorry for posting this reply in a funny place, I'm just clicking the most appropriate 'Reply' I can find.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 20:46:55 -0000

I'd rather not have the last word. How is your view any less subject to the infinite regress? And why do you think it's wise to admit hundreds and hundreds of propositions as "properly basic", without any grounds for this?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

anselm — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 19:40:48 -0000

"Basically, I think your theory of knowledge is terribly reckless with the truth."

Ok, and I am saying that your theory of knowledge, which acknowledges it is caught in an infinite regress, has no basis for saying that anything is true, including "uninterpreted experience," and so ends in epistemological nihilism. But since this is your blog, that will be my last salvo on this issue, so feel free to have the last word :)

Sincerely, I appreciate the opportunity for dialog; I know you put a tremendous amount of work into making this forum available and you are doing an excellent job.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 18:58:28 -0000

Oops, here is the link.

Here's what I'm saying. There is no theory of knowledge that can escape an infinite regress. Any principle you lay down for justifying your knowledge must itself be justified, which must itself be justified, which must itself be justified...

Here, let's look at it using the language of foundationalism: that the termination of this infinite regress ends in one or more properly basic beliefs, which are used to justify everything else. What I'm saying is that we shouldn't just allow ourselves a whole bunch of properly basic beliefs that may or may not be true (for example, that Shiva exists and lying is always wrong and all kinds of uncertain things). That's pretty reckless to do that.

I'm saying that we should only consider things to be properly basic if it is literally true that they cannot be false. What things cannot be false? Not much. It could be that the hand I hold in front of my face is not really there. It could be that I'm in the Matrix. It could even be that I don't even exist, but that my continuous stream of inner perceptions are continuously created by a Cartesian demon - I could be nothing but a stream of perceptions that is aware of its perceptions.

Wow. So, what is literally undeniable? Descartes tried to say, "I think, therefore I am." Even that was too ambitious. He should have said, "There is a thought, so a thinking thing thinks."

And these are the safest basic beliefs to admit: uninterpreted experience. From there, we build up probabilistic models of reality.

If instead we build our models of reality on a long list of (seemingly arbitrarily chosen) basic beliefs - including belief in other minds, belief in various souls and spirits and such, belief in certain moral values but not other ones - where do we stop? Why the heck should we admit such a long list of beliefs as properly basic, and how would you argue against someone who admits belief in Shiva or belief in murder's moral goodness as properly basic? I don't think you could.

Basically, I think your theory of knowledge is terribly reckless with the truth.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

anselm — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 17:24:23 -0000

Your link did not work, but that's ok. It seems you are in a classic "pot-kettle" situation when you criticize proper basicality for not having sufficient justification, yet your own criterion for truth is tautological. Or are you now saying your criterion is "properly basic" and withdrawing your previous objections to that concept? And thus that knowledge we apprehend noninferentially and psychologically directly does, indeed, qualify as "knowledge"?

And as a follow-up, what is the source of your confidence that your noetic equipment is trustworthy in translating your immediate experience into truth about fundamental reality?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 15:32:35 -0000

Experience is all we have, inner or outer. You might say that your inner experience (for example, that you talk to God) is validated because you inner experience says it is validated. That's just as circular. There is no non-circular theory of knowledge. Richard Carrier has some thoughts on that here. Carrier thinks that the safest way to end the infinite regress is to end it only with things that literally cannot be untrue: immediate, uninterpreted experience. Perhaps instead you think the infinite regress should end at an arbitrarily chosen set of thousands of basic beliefs about God and moral values and other minds and perhaps other things?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

anselm — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 14:43:06 -0000

Since "scientific evidence" is just a systematized version of "observation and experience," aren't you saying that "I know observation and experience is the test for truth because of observation and experience"? Why isn't that circular?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 14:21:14 -0000

Again, only by observation. I'm not saying this is a metaphysical proposition written into the fabric of the universe. I'm just saying this is an observation of how our universe seems to work, drawing on billions of human experiences throughout history.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

anselm — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 14:13:31 -0000

But since the proposition "philosophical logic and scientific evidence are our best methods for discerning truth" is not arrived at through philosophical logic and scientific evidence, how do you know that proposition is true?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 14:04:16 -0000

"For Lisa to not be poisoned, she SHOULD not drink poison." This is a true statement that is not well explained without reference to normative facts. That is different that moral facts, to be sure, but it is a defeater to your point #1.

> Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. <

What else would "normative" mean?

Re: desire utilitarianism and ethical non-naturalism. Desire utilitarianism refers to reasons for action that exist in the natural world: desires. Ethical non-naturalists refer to reasons for action that do not exist in the natural world. (As it happens, ethical non-naturalists also refer to reasons for action that do not exist at all.)

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 13:48:05 -0000

By testing I just mean that we are trying to figure out the truth about moral facts, if there are any moral facts. So far it turns out that philosophical logic and scientific evidence are our best methods for discerning truth. These criteria are, obviously, always subject to revision - what you call a "vicious infinite regress - because we only trust these criteria because they have given us more reliable knowledge than other methods so far.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

toweltowel — Thu, 02 Apr 2009 00:54:51 -0000

I'll reply to both comments here, since this is the only place 'Reply' is showing up.

1. Consider a thoroughgoing antirealism about normativity (what might be called 'nihilism'). Moral properties don't exist, value doesn't exist, reasons for action don't exist, no 'oughts', no 'shoulds'. A normative antirealist could presumably give an entirely empirically successful account of human psychology (including intentional action), invoking beliefs and desires and other psychological states, but never invoking mysterious 'reasons' that ought to be followed or taken into account. Thus I don't see any empirical gain in accepting normative reasons, much less identifying them with desires, since all the empirical work can be done by non-normative psychology.

2. Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. That means only that those who desire x have a certain attitude towards x—a positively evaluating, desiring sort of attitude. And these psychological facts are acceptable to any normative antirealist, to any nihilist.

3. You draw a contrast between desire utilitarianism with ethical non-naturalism. But I think the two views are perfectly compatible, and that their compatibility reveals something important.

An ethical non-naturalist will think that reasons for action are non-natural properties (or perhaps relations) that supervene upon natural properties. But which natural properties constitute the supervenience base, i.e. what is it that gives reasons for action? Well, a non-naturalist is free to say that desires are what constitute the supervenience base, i.e. that desires are what give reasons for actions. And a non-naturalist is similarly free to say that the overall tendency of a desire to fulfill desires is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of goodness, and that an action's being an action which a person with good desires would perform is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of rightness.

So, in general, the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism can be easily accommodated by a non-naturalist metaethic. Of course, a metaethical naturalist could also accept desire utiltiarianism, supplementing the supervenience relations with identity (or constitution or whatever) relations. Indeed, it seems that any metaethical view could accept the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism.

What I think this reveals is that a focus on reasons for action does nothing to dispel the classic metaethical questions. It's just that now the questions are about the nature of reasons for action—are reasons for action non-natural, are they natural, are they nonexistent, or are they the artifact of superficially-descriptive-but-really-expressivist language?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

anselm — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 23:31:22 -0000

It seems the term "tested" in your criterion needs to be fleshed out. Does it mean "empirically verified"? (then you have fallen into verificationism). Does it mean "confirmed by the scientific method"? (then you have fallen into scientism).

After posting my question, I did some further reading and realized I had stumbled into a very old issue in philosophy of knowledge, namely "the problem of the criterion." So I'm sure we are sort of reinventing the wheel here from perspective of the professional philosopher--but that's ok, since that is conducive to our learning.

Apparently the two primary solutions to the "problem of the criterion" are "methodism" (not the Christian denomination!), under which one starts the enterprise of knowing with a criterion for what does and does not count as knowledge. The problem is it is subject to a "vicious infinite regress', because how do you know that the criterion itself counts as knowledge?

The other solution is "particularism," under which some types of knowledge are properly basic and are known directly and simply without having to have criteria for how one knows them (e.g., "murder is wrong," "other minds exist", etc.). Of course, I know you reject this.

But until you resolve the issues presented by the criterion of knowledge you present above, I don't see how you can move forward to construct and defend an ethical theory--if you are unsure how knowledge can be attained, then how can you determine whether you have knowledge of what is right and wrong?

(This might be a good question for the "atheist ethicist"--maybe I should post it in the comments on your most recent blog post?)

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:35:08 -0000

A proposition works if the predictions entailed by the proposition turn out to be true when tested, moreso than the predictions of competing propositions about the same subject.

But you're right that I can't defend any theory of knowledge very well right now. I simply observe that science and logic are by far our most reliable methods for truth-gathering, and I can't see any reason to accept thousands of moral propositions as properly basic, nor of course belief in various gods as properly basic.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:30:41 -0000

> It just means they shouldn't be ignored wholesale in favor of some moral theory that can't ever get along with them. <

Why should our moral feelings not be ignored? Do they have something of value to contribute to the question of what exists and what does not? If so, why do you think so? Do our feelings have anything to contribute to our investigation of whether or not germs cause disease, or whether or not the sun in 93 million miles away, or whether or not virtual particles pop into existence uncaused, or whether or not humans are descended from apes, or whether or not water is H2O?

> It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. <

Why? Because you concluded a priori that moral values do not exist?

> What in the world could you possibly be talking about? <

Morality talks about objective reasons for action that exist. Perhaps there are some such things that exist, or perhaps there are not. I've come to think there are, but I could be wrong.

> Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. <

Feelings do not have to factor in to the facts about morality, just as they do not have to factor into the facts about chemistry. They will, of course - until we can make robot scientists - but that doesn't mean they should, if we are looking for truth.

> All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed. <

Is this how you treat all other domains of fact, too? Emotions must check the facts about planet formation, or neutrinos, or cosmic expansion? We should test these things against our feelings about them?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:21:18 -0000

Empirical observation can "rule out" (provisionally, of course) ethical theories that say desires are not reasons for action because the most empirically successful model of intentional action says that desires are the only reasons for action that people have.

Re: "How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say... that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing...?" Well, "good" means we have objective reasons for action to do something - so either there are objective reasons for action that exist or there are not. That's an empirical question, as noted above.

And how can reason and evidence weigh on the question of what is desired having value? We can, for example, search the world for intrinsic value. Not finding any, we know that desires create no "intrinsic value." We can also note that, for example, when something is desired, it has value at least to the person who desires it.

As for the rest, are you talking about the is-ought gap? If so, I suggest you read this recent article.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:12:43 -0000

Oh, gotcha. As it happens, I think every theory of moral realism except for desire utilitarianism would fail the test. For example, theories of ethical non-naturalism have no evidence going for them.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:09:42 -0000

There probably is a possible world in which some types of sadism are morally good, but the world of 20 super-sadists and one child is not it. If we turn the knob on sadism all the way up, then we have lots of desire-fulfilled sadists and one extremely desire-thwarted child. In contrast, if we turn down the knob all the way, nobody's desires are being thwarted, and all have the opportunity to be fulfilled. So, we have reasons for action to turn down the knob on sadism through the use of social forces. Why? Keep the analogies you work with very small and think of the parable told in A Harmony of Desires.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

lukeprog — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 22:05:52 -0000

We're in the same position with regard to all knowledge, including scientific knowledge. We must admit our biases, and then do our best to eliminate them and seek the truth with our best methods for truth-gathering that we have.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

toweltowel — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 18:57:56 -0000

Oh, and after a quick glance at the book, I think I can focus the Humean challenge as follows.

How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say that human desires do not count as reasons for action, that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing, and that what is desired need not be valuable at all? This appears to be a logically consistent and empirically unproblematic way of mapping the normative realm of reasons and value onto the descriptive realm of desires and actions. So I don't see how empirical observation and logic could have anything to say about it.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

toweltowel — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 18:47:45 -0000

I think there's a misunderstanding. I wasn't complaining that certain ethical theories wouldn't pass the tests. My complaint was that EVERY ethical theory WOULD pass the test, because mere empirical observation and logic aren't capable of evaluating ethical theories pro or con.

Surely if I'm right about this (it's an old Humean view), then the tests are not actually tests.

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Ben — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 17:51:43 -0000

No. You keep framing the question in a ridiculous way and I wonder what the point of that is. My point is that basic moral intuitions ultimately need to plug into any worthwhile moral theory and that they are a necessary part of a good system of checks and balances. It doesn't mean they are the only standard or that they are always right. It just means they shouldn't be ignored wholesale in favor of some moral theory that can't ever get along with them. If you do agree with this (as you conceded humanity has some common moral ground even though we'd never know that from reading your post), then you should probably have said something like, "Our natural moral intuitions are important, but can also be mistaken, and we need to make sure we've gotten things right with other means like logic and reason." There goes your entire post. Simple, obvious, effective and doesn't take the inquiry careening into all sorts of worthless directions and causing all sorts of unnecessary problems.

"...based not on our feelings, but on what we actually find out there in the universe, and what conforms to logic."

It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. What in the world could you possibly be talking about? A morality that is all logic is just as worthless as one that is all feeling, since there is ultimately no reason to be moral or care about anything. So if you are looking for a logic only morality, I'll save you the trouble. There isn't one nor can there be. Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. I thought I'd save you that cliche' bit of self-deception, but as is you're either going to come up with something that is just as refutable as what you dismiss on your own terms, you'll end in some kind of stupid Dr. Manhattanesque nihilism, or you'll just be really confused and wandering through various ethical theories for a really long time. All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed.

If this isn't a helpful heads up, then pretend like I didn't say anything. ;)

Ben

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Jeff H — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 15:26:26 -0000

"I explain this in that same chapter of my book. Think of the analogy of the knobs."

I suppose this is the one point where perhaps I'm not clear about it. I understand the whole knobs analogy - increasing or decreasing the desire to torture children throughout society - but you conclude that the best place to set the knob is at zero. But I suppose I'm a little unclear as to how you decided this. Let's use the example of the population of 20 sadists and one child that you give. For simplicity's sake, let's just say that these people are the only ones in the world. So we have 20 people who strongly desire to torture a child and only one child who desires not to be tortured. You conclude that "The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater
desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire." But what that says to me is that IF the desire to torture children was strong enough (let's give it a really high value of 10,000), it could outweigh all of the child's desires to not be tortured (100), to grow up (15), to sleep properly (25), etc. These are arbitrary numbers, but if I'm understanding the theory correctly, these values would mean that the desire to torture children is a GOOD desire because it tends to fulfill more and stronger desires than it thwarts. In this case, the torturers are right to torture the child, and indeed the moral thing for the child to do is to accept the torture. We should set the knob at 100%.

Am I misunderstanding the theory, or is that how the "calculation" would really work?

Re: The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

kevinbbg — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 13:02:34 -0000

I'm saying we do have moral values, they are simply created by us and will continue to change as our societies change, and no matter how much logic is applied to it our emotions will still take charge.

In the samurai example above both you and I immediately and without question, took the position that the samurai was wrong to kill peasants like that, then we looked for logical reasons why it was wrong. We would have to start out in neutral then use logic and reason to discover if he was right or wrong.

I will admit that the very idea of possibly condoning that kind of behavior upsets me.

However, I don't disagree with what you are trying to do. Reason and logic do need to be applied to moral and ethical standards otherwise we are just blinding following what our culture taught us.

But we also have to admit that we start from a biased position and can't do anything else.