I think this raises some interesting questions, but I don't know how to apply it. Applying logical systems requires confidence in one's assumptions, and finding "true" assumptions is precisely the problem you've demonstrated here.
What assumptions would you use to evaluate the logic of an ethical theory?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
I said we'd need to evaluate ethical theories based on logic and evidence. Are you asking something else?
Evil Bender
· 9 months ago
I'm asking what premises we can accept as true and so allow us to evaluate any ethical theory. I completely agree that logic and evidence are essential, but I think in terms or morality there are large problems in finding correct assumptions on which to base one's logic.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Oh, sure. This is all explained in my very short ebook on ethical theory.
BTW, even if we didn't yet have good premises, etc. to start with, that doesn't mean we should turn to really bad tools. Just like when we had no way to know that lightning was caused by electric charges, that didn't mean "Zeus" was a good answer.
There are two big tasks for someone who wishes to build a moral theory that is true:
1) If it is to be a theory about morality, it must capture what we typically mean when we use moral terms. This is the semantic challenge.
2) The theory must make claims that are actually true about the world, based on good evidence and reason.
If condition (2) is satisfied but not condition (1), then we have a good theory that is true but it just so happens to not be about morality. For example, it might be a true theory about aesthetics, even though we started out trying to build a moral theory.
If condition (1) is satisfied but not condition (2) - which is usually the case - then we have a moral theory but no good reason to think it is true.
As for how desire utilitarianism is semantically true, see here. As for how desire utilitarianism is factually true, see my book.
Jeffrey
· 9 months ago
I don't think that your answer gets around the problem of unreliable morality detectors. For logic to do anything, it needs some premises to get started.
I don't see how logic can do more than check for internal consistency and if particular actions succeed in serving your overall goals. But you still need overall goals, like promoting happiness and reducing suffering. No matter what your overall goals are - but why? To get overall goals, you still need some kind of a morality/value detector.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Yes, evidence brings us information and logic checks for internal consistency.
Of course to get moral goals you need a way to detect them, but I propose that the way to detect them is with the tools of science, since it appears we do not have an internal morality detector. It would be easier if we did, but it is a fact of the matter that we do not.
Ben
· 9 months ago
You seem to be framing an inquiry that can't find useful results. At some level whatever objective moral facts we discover need to be amicable to our moral intuitions or else there's really no reason to follow them. Let's say we do discover a rigid intrinsic set of moral values and it's so disconnected from our impulses that we can never feel right about ever engaging in it. Maybe following it makes us feel constantly guilty or something else that is incredibly dysfunctional to the human condition. If you start turning your ship of "evidence and logic" away from the facts of human psychology you will run into all kinds of disasters, never settle on anything and reject a whole lot of obvious things most people will take for granted. It seems you're already well on your way there to no where.
You make too much of the differences between cultures and not enough about the similarities. I suggest looking into scientific studies on the similarities before you toss up your hands and say there's no common ground. These are noob mistakes, in my opinion. Common sense says you will fail and unless you want to embrace the magic of Platonism, you'll come back to your senses. Good luck, regardless.
Ben
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
There is some common ground, but even that is no indication that we have an accurate morality detector in our heads. No, it is an indication that our species evolved to have feelings about certain things one way or another. Ben, when we are able to deconstruct the entire brain and find that there is indeed no "sixth sense" for the direct observation of moral values, then what will you say?
To say that we "need" an intuitive moral sense to test moral theories is like saying we "need" an intuitive astronomical sense to test astronomical theories.
You seem to be interested in moral theories that are workable - that people cannot actually follow. That's fine. We are then talking about two different things. You are talking about a moral theory that is workable. I am talking about a moral theory that happens to be true. I'm after truth.
Smilansky has argued something similar to your thinking with regard to free will. He says that it's becoming clear that we do not have free will, but such a discovery is not workable in human society. Human society will degenerate if philosophers and nueroscientists tell the common people that they do not have free will. So, we have to lie to the people and tell them that "Everything's okay, we found free will. It exists. You have it. Be good, now."
I don't think society will fall apart with the knowledge that free will does not exist. But let's say I'm wrong. Perhaps we SHOULD lie to people about free will, just because that's more workable. That's a debate worth having.
But, back to morality, that is not the debate I'm having here. I'm arguing about a test for what's true, not about what's workable. Indeed, testing moral theories against our moral intuitions is a decent test for workability. All I said above is that it is not a decent test for truth.
Ben
· 9 months ago
What you call "the wrong test" I would call "one test among others" and then all of the sudden our moral intuitions have a reasonable role to play. You even validate this with you own impulse, "Perhaps I had even made a net negative impact on the world because of it! Had I made the world a worse place because I’d been following a false ethical system, or had I gotten lucky and not caused too much harm?" How can even this question be valid or worthwhile if the so called human "morality detectors" are complete crap? You are wasting your brain power on unnecessary extremes and are sabotaging your pursuit of moral truth in the process.
Are you to the part in Sense and Goodness where Carrier lays out his moral theory? Why don't you read that and get back to me. Or you can watch the video here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dce8mE0q4zA
Ben
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
> How can even this question be valid or worthwhile if the so called human "morality detectors" are complete crap? <
The question is valid because I don't trust my magical morality detectors. Do you really think we evolved to have a special mental faculty for detecting moral facts? Richard Carrier doesn't think so, either.
Ben
· 9 months ago
No. You keep framing the question in a ridiculous way and I wonder what the point of that is. My point is that basic moral intuitions ultimately need to plug into any worthwhile moral theory and that they are a necessary part of a good system of checks and balances. It doesn't mean they are the only standard or that they are always right. It just means they shouldn't be ignored wholesale in favor of some moral theory that can't ever get along with them. If you do agree with this (as you conceded humanity has some common moral ground even though we'd never know that from reading your post), then you should probably have said something like, "Our natural moral intuitions are important, but can also be mistaken, and we need to make sure we've gotten things right with other means like logic and reason." There goes your entire post. Simple, obvious, effective and doesn't take the inquiry careening into all sorts of worthless directions and causing all sorts of unnecessary problems.
"...based not on our feelings, but on what we actually find out there in the universe, and what conforms to logic."
It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. What in the world could you possibly be talking about? A morality that is all logic is just as worthless as one that is all feeling, since there is ultimately no reason to be moral or care about anything. So if you are looking for a logic only morality, I'll save you the trouble. There isn't one nor can there be. Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. I thought I'd save you that cliche' bit of self-deception, but as is you're either going to come up with something that is just as refutable as what you dismiss on your own terms, you'll end in some kind of stupid Dr. Manhattanesque nihilism, or you'll just be really confused and wandering through various ethical theories for a really long time. All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed.
If this isn't a helpful heads up, then pretend like I didn't say anything. ;)
Ben
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
> It just means they shouldn't be ignored wholesale in favor of some moral theory that can't ever get along with them. <
Why should our moral feelings not be ignored? Do they have something of value to contribute to the question of what exists and what does not? If so, why do you think so? Do our feelings have anything to contribute to our investigation of whether or not germs cause disease, or whether or not the sun in 93 million miles away, or whether or not virtual particles pop into existence uncaused, or whether or not humans are descended from apes, or whether or not water is H2O?
> It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. <
Why? Because you concluded a priori that moral values do not exist?
> What in the world could you possibly be talking about? <
Morality talks about objective reasons for action that exist. Perhaps there are some such things that exist, or perhaps there are not. I've come to think there are, but I could be wrong.
> Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. <
Feelings do not have to factor in to the facts about morality, just as they do not have to factor into the facts about chemistry. They will, of course - until we can make robot scientists - but that doesn't mean they should, if we are looking for truth.
> All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed. <
Is this how you treat all other domains of fact, too? Emotions must check the facts about planet formation, or neutrinos, or cosmic expansion? We should test these things against our feelings about them?
Richard_tich
· 9 months ago
Testing. (Sorry)
anselm
· 9 months ago
"Let’s say we have evolved a “sixth sense” that can directly detect moral values. Can it be trusted? I think not...It is a simple consequence of the fact that we have not evolved reliable morality detectors that we must choose an ethical theory just as we would a scientific theory: based not on our feelings, but on what we actually find out there in the universe, and what conforms to logic.
What is your basis for saying our evolved "logical sense" is reliable, since its application varies widely across cultures (e.g., in Eastern philosophy where even the law of non-contradiction is denied) and also appears to be unnecessary for survival (witness the countless well-adapted species with no such sense)?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
We have NOT evolved a logical sense that is reliable. Rather, we have found that the particularly consistent rules of logic/math are found to be incredibly reliable. That was not an evolved sense, but a discovered set of necessary truths. If we lived in a universe where strict logic did not lead toward truth, we would not use it. It just so happens that the application of logic does lead to truth. And it seems you know this, since you use logic in persuasion and you accept the work of analytic philosophers, etc.
anselm
· 9 months ago
How do you know that your application of logic leads to truth? Because the result of your reasoning feels true?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
No, because it works. When we apply mathematics we get answers that work. Try to build a car using bad logic or bad math. Try to fly a plane. Try to design software. Try to build roads. Try to draw a triangle. Logic and math work. We don't know why our universe obeys the laws of logic and math 100% of the time but it does. It could very well be that our universe did not obeys the laws of logic and math, but it just so happens that it does. That's just an observation about how the world works. I do not presume it. If I presumed logic in a universe that had no logic, I would be wrong.
anselm
· 9 months ago
I'm not clear on your intended meaning of the word "works" in your proposed definition of truth. What is the criterion for determining whether a proposition "works" or not? (I don't believe the criterion is "must be empirically verified" since you earlier said you reject verficationism and logical positivism).
For example, Eastern philosophy rejects the law of noncontradiction, yet it provides Eastern philosophers with the metaphysics that they want--it "works" for them; so is it true for that reason?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Ask the Eastern philosopher to build a working car without assuming the principle of noncontradiction (and everything that follows from it). Ask him to correctly predict where Jupiter will be in 9 years without the math and logic. Almost nothing works in our universe if you do not assume the law of noncontradiction.
anselm
· 9 months ago
As a follow-up, I note in your reply to Ben above you say:
"You are talking about a moral theory that is workable. I am talking about a moral theory that happens to be true. I'm after truth."
Doesn't this contradict your definition of truth as what "works"?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
No, let me clarify. Truth is what corresponds to reality. A very handy tool to find out what is true is to test a theory (or an epistemic method) and see if it works in our universe.
"works" is a vague word and I'm using it in two different senses. Let's say we decided that we wanted to know the exact average height of everyone on the planet at 2:32:00pm PST on May 13, 2011. We know certain methods of measuring height that "work", and in measuring we would be making lots of assumptions about what exists in the universe because those assumptions "work." But this plan to apply all these bits of knowledge to measure the exact average height humanity is unworkable, even though it depends on real knowledge (that "works") about things like height and sight and human anatomy and measurement and maths.
kevinbbg
· 9 months ago
You are seeing things all wrong here, you are still looking for some kind of absolute morality that can be relied on and that is just Christian thinking. Even a light look through history shows that there is no set morality, it does not exist outside of us but is created by us.
In ancient Japan a samurai could kill a commoner any time he wanted, we'd call that murder. In what way were the samurai wrong? There is no way to make that claim unless you first make an assumption; that all life is precious or that we must treat other's as we expect to be treated, etc. But those are a priory moral assumptions based on your Western Christian upbringing.
What would be the logical reasons why a samurai killing a peasant who offended him be wrong? That he destroyed his shogun's property without permission? Is that really moral?
Face it, you would find logical reasons why what those ancient samurai's did was wrong based on the feelings you have from your upbringing.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
This is exactly the bias that I strive against by suggesting that moral values - if they exist - cannot be discovered by consulting our feelings. We must use evidence and reason, as in science. If it turns out that moral values do not exist - that they were nothing but feelings all along - then moral values do not exist. But if it turns out that moral values do exist when we investigate our universe with the tools of logic and evidence, then they do exist, and exist totally apart from how we feel about them.
> In ancient Japan a samurai could kill a commoner any time he wanted, we'd call that murder. In what way were the samurai wrong? There is no way to make that claim unless you first make an assumption; that all life is precious or that we must treat other's as we expect to be treated, etc. <
No, that's not the only way to claim the samurai is wrong. For example, desire utilitarianism would argue that the samurai's action was morally wrong, but desire utilitarianism does not claim that life is precious or that treating others as we want to be treated is a principle with intrinsic value.
It seems we probably agree that moral theories must be evaluated on grounds of evidence and logic, but you just happen to think there are no such things as moral values. I think that is a respectable position. At the moment I am persuaded otherwise, but I could easily be wrong.
kevinbbg
· 9 months ago
I'm saying we do have moral values, they are simply created by us and will continue to change as our societies change, and no matter how much logic is applied to it our emotions will still take charge.
In the samurai example above both you and I immediately and without question, took the position that the samurai was wrong to kill peasants like that, then we looked for logical reasons why it was wrong. We would have to start out in neutral then use logic and reason to discover if he was right or wrong.
I will admit that the very idea of possibly condoning that kind of behavior upsets me.
However, I don't disagree with what you are trying to do. Reason and logic do need to be applied to moral and ethical standards otherwise we are just blinding following what our culture taught us.
But we also have to admit that we start from a biased position and can't do anything else.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
We're in the same position with regard to all knowledge, including scientific knowledge. We must admit our biases, and then do our best to eliminate them and seek the truth with our best methods for truth-gathering that we have.
akakiwibear
· 9 months ago
I agree with kevinbbg. I think this is a case of the wrong tool for the job. Logic and morality have little to contribute to each other.
Let me explain. Given a situation that requires a decision (why label any decisions as moral?) if we are logical we will evaluate the outcomes and rank them according to criteria. But the criteria we choose pre-selects the outcome as preferred. So we need to step back to the criteria which we will apply.
Logically those criteria should be for our greatest benefit – anything else is irrational. If I skip a few steps in the reasoning you will fill them in and … so by and large we get to ‘to might is right’.
This is the basis of our survival as an evolutionary species and is the rational end point of logic based morality.
Any morality which dilutes our ability to procreate is contra to evolutionary need. There is evidence that sociopathic tendencies are dominant rather than recessive in the gene pool – for this very reason? The concept that we are all better off if society is better off is a demonstrable nonsense. Small group survival to the exclusion of other groups is the best guarantee of access to resources. Lots of consumers for the global corporates is a short term win for the “personality” of the corporates – they know that they are depleting resources (not theirs – that of others initially). (As an aside - Interesting to view corporate behaviour as that of “persons”, it then makes a lot of sense = Organisational Dynamics as a behaviour science)
It is the common thread of the worlds’ major religions' teachings (include the apparently non-theist ones too … they provide for some form of life after) that provides the only input to the moral debate that is not entirely self serving. The ‘do to others … love your neighbour’ style golden rule is setting oneself up to be vulnerable – one could argue that it is the logical teaching of those who have no intention of following it.
If you want morality you have to look to the spiritual dimension - sorry about that.
Sala kahle -peace
Jeff H
· 9 months ago
Hi there! I recently followed a link on over from the Debunking Christianity blog, so I've only been here for a little while, but I also recently read your eBook on desire utilitarianism. I found it very thought-provoking (in fact, I even downloaded it to my computer for future reference!), but I have a couple points of contention about it.
First off, in some cases it seems to contradict what one's feelings might say about morality. That may be okay, but wouldn't these feelings at least give us a general guide of what we could consider right and wrong? Perhaps it's a bit too vague. But desire utilitarianism would seem to say that if we lived in a world where everyone desired to be raped or stolen from, then it would be right to do so. I know that logically that might be the case, but something about it still offends my moral feelings about the matter. A visitor to the hypothetical world from this one would view everyone there as insane. Indeed, if a person desired that in this world, we would probably say they needed a good psychiatrist. So why is it wrong to murder a person who wants to be murdered when it is just one individual, but right to murder them when the entire population feels that way? And at what point along that continuum does it go from being wrong to right?
Another point to make - and this might just be a case of misunderstanding - is the idea of evaluating desires. At one point you say that "The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire. A person with good desires would not torture children, so torturing children is a wrong action to perform." My question is what more and greater desires are you considering here? We have 20 sadists who desire to torture a child, versus one child who desires not to be tortured. How does one evaluate which desires take precedence over others, especially when we cannot use our moral intuitions on the matter? And such a calculation seems as impossible as a good utilitarian "hedonic calculus" problem - how do we evaluate a complex moral problem when we must take into consideration everyone's desires, possible desires (because we can't know for sure what they want), etc.? Perhaps such a moral framework is not practical.
At any rate, perhaps what I've said is based on a misunderstanding of your eBook, so maybe you could clarify if I went wrong somewhere? Let me say once again that I certainly enjoyed it, and I recognize the problem with finding "goodness" and "badness" in the physical world. Cheers!
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Jeff,
Thanks for your interest.
Yes, desire utilitarianism goes against one's feelings. I don't think that's a problem. Many scientific facts have contradicted our feelings. But do we trust our feelings, or the facts? If there are moral facts, it should not be surprising at all that they contradict our feelings.
{ So why is it wrong to murder a person who wants to be murdered when it is just one individual, but right to murder them when the entire population feels that way? And at what point along that continuum does it go from being wrong to right? }
Excellent question.
First, I did not say that it is wrong to kill a person who wants to be killed. We must consider all desires. Would this thwart the desires of this person's family and friends? Would it thwart other desires? In general, would the decision to kill those who want to be killed tend to thwart more desires than it fulfills? These are tough questions to answer, but those would be things to look into. I don't think I know the answer to that question, but the question can (in theory) be answered if we do enough research.
{ My question is what more and greater desires are you considering here? We have 20 sadists who desire to torture a child, versus one child who desires not to be tortured. How does one evaluate which desires take precedence over others, especially when we cannot use our moral intuitions on the matter? }
I explain this in that same chapter of my book. Think of the analogy of the knobs.
{ Perhaps such a moral framework is not practical. }
It's difficult to measure desires across the whole world, obviously. That doesn't make the claims of the theory incorrect at all. It merely makes the theory difficult to apply. This is true of many scientific theories.
Jeff H
· 9 months ago
"I explain this in that same chapter of my book. Think of the analogy of the knobs."
I suppose this is the one point where perhaps I'm not clear about it. I understand the whole knobs analogy - increasing or decreasing the desire to torture children throughout society - but you conclude that the best place to set the knob is at zero. But I suppose I'm a little unclear as to how you decided this. Let's use the example of the population of 20 sadists and one child that you give. For simplicity's sake, let's just say that these people are the only ones in the world. So we have 20 people who strongly desire to torture a child and only one child who desires not to be tortured. You conclude that "The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire." But what that says to me is that IF the desire to torture children was strong enough (let's give it a really high value of 10,000), it could outweigh all of the child's desires to not be tortured (100), to grow up (15), to sleep properly (25), etc. These are arbitrary numbers, but if I'm understanding the theory correctly, these values would mean that the desire to torture children is a GOOD desire because it tends to fulfill more and stronger desires than it thwarts. In this case, the torturers are right to torture the child, and indeed the moral thing for the child to do is to accept the torture. We should set the knob at 100%.
Am I misunderstanding the theory, or is that how the "calculation" would really work?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
There probably is a possible world in which some types of sadism are morally good, but the world of 20 super-sadists and one child is not it. If we turn the knob on sadism all the way up, then we have lots of desire-fulfilled sadists and one extremely desire-thwarted child. In contrast, if we turn down the knob all the way, nobody's desires are being thwarted, and all have the opportunity to be fulfilled. So, we have reasons for action to turn down the knob on sadism through the use of social forces. Why? Keep the analogies you work with very small and think of the parable told in A Harmony of Desires.
Jeff H
· 9 months ago
My apologies. I didn't mean to reply to akakiwibear - I just clicked the wrong link. Sorry for the confusion (and the length!).
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
akakiwibear, I have no idea what you're talking about. Of course we can't pick a criteria arbitrarily and then apply logic and evidence. We don't do that in science, either.
The reason I recommend logic and evidence is that we already know they are our best methods for gaining reliable knowledge. If moral facts do not exist, well then no method can find them. If moral facts do exist, we should use our most trusted knowledge-gathering tools to discover them.
On what grounds would you recommend a spiritual question for morality? Spiritual methods have an awful track record of uncovering facts.
anselm
· 9 months ago
Sorry, the "reply" button disappeared on the thin thread above, so I have placed my follow-up comment down here. Two thoughts:
1) In all of your examples of what "works," I'm not clear on why there is a distinction between that and "what is useful to human beings" (predicting physical events, building machines, etc.). Are you saying you consider "what is useful" to be equivalent to "what is true?" In that case, believing that 2 + 2 = 4 is true because it is useful in performing engineering tasks, and believing "free will exists" is true because it is useful in preventing society from degenerating (assuming that would occur if the concept of free will was rejected).
2) Perhaps you could explain the difference between your view and logical positivism, because thus far they appear identical (based on my reading regarding logical positivism, which I admit is not tremendously extensive). Thanks.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
1) Don't confuse descriptive usefulness and normative usefulness. An atomic bomb "works" quite well for degenerating society.
2) I am influenced by logical positivism, but have never adhered to verificationism, and am quite aware of the criticisms of logical positivism. I have not yet settled on a comprehensive theory of knowledge.
anselm
· 9 months ago
Fair enough. But I really don't see how "normative usefulness" can avoid degenerating into verificationism (as the examples you give of what passes muster as "true" would indicate--i.e, scientific predictions, science as applied to feats of engineering, etc.). And as I'm sure you're aware, such a criterion of truthfulness is self-refuting because the criterion itself is not subject to empirical verification. But perhaps you can flesh out why your concept of normative usefulness avoids that problem in future posts.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Sorry, I'm using non-standard terms and I'm sure that is confusing. Normative usefulness, as I meant it, has nothing to do with verificationism. Normativity is not about factual knowledge, but about goal-directed recommendations. "If you want to blow up a million people, you should use an atom bomb."
Let me use standard terms instead. I'm suggesting a pragmatic theory of truth. But again, I haven't settled on a theory of knowledge yet, so I'm not prepared to defend that very well! But I don't see any reason to think we have a sensus divinitatus, or to think that claims about moral facts can be justified without any reasons given.
anselm
· 9 months ago
Thanks, that is helpful. Pragmatism would definitely be in line with your earlier statements denying the existence of either a "moral sense" or a "logical sense" in our cognitive faculties, and would be consistent with atheistic view of how we evolved. Since under atheistic naturalism we are essentially "DNA-replicating machines", all we could say is that our belief-forming mechanisms have been adapted to "what works" for our survival--i.e., getting our bodies and body parts in the right place so that the species continues on to the next generation. As atheist philosopher Patricia Churchland as said:
"Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive … . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."
In that case, "truth" could best be redefined as "what serves the purpose of our survival" (as opposed to "what reflects fundamental reality"). I think pragmatists like Richard Rorty have grasped the implications of this in a profound way, we caused him to reject "objective truth" in favor of "intersubjective truth" (see http://tinyurl.com/4u6cz).
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
No, I mean nothing like that truth is "what works for survival." The mechnisms inside an atomic bomb work because they are true, but they are terrible for survival.
toweltowel
· 9 months ago
If we employ only empirical observation and logic, I don't think we will ever arrive at any moral views at all.
After all, I know of nothing observable by empirical means or required by logic that recommends happiness as superior to misery. Or the satisfaction of desires as superior to the frustration of desires. Or kindness as superior to cruelty.
To put it another way, I would think that every ethical theory—no matter how implausible (e.g., the anti-utilitarian one that says to maximize overall misery)—would pass these tests. Which means these tests couldn't actually function as tests.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
No, they WOULD function as tests. Just because something doesn't pass the tests doesn't make them bad tests. Pseudoscience and magic don't pass these tests, either.
To see why I think one ethical theory passes these tests but not any others, see my ethics book linked in the sidebar.
toweltowel
· 9 months ago
I think there's a misunderstanding. I wasn't complaining that certain ethical theories wouldn't pass the tests. My complaint was that EVERY ethical theory WOULD pass the test, because mere empirical observation and logic aren't capable of evaluating ethical theories pro or con.
Surely if I'm right about this (it's an old Humean view), then the tests are not actually tests.
toweltowel
· 9 months ago
Oh, and after a quick glance at the book, I think I can focus the Humean challenge as follows.
How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say that human desires do not count as reasons for action, that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing, and that what is desired need not be valuable at all? This appears to be a logically consistent and empirically unproblematic way of mapping the normative realm of reasons and value onto the descriptive realm of desires and actions. So I don't see how empirical observation and logic could have anything to say about it.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Empirical observation can "rule out" (provisionally, of course) ethical theories that say desires are not reasons for action because the most empirically successful model of intentional action says that desires are the only reasons for action that people have.
Re: "How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say... that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing...?" Well, "good" means we have objective reasons for action to do something - so either there are objective reasons for action that exist or there are not. That's an empirical question, as noted above.
And how can reason and evidence weigh on the question of what is desired having value? We can, for example, search the world for intrinsic value. Not finding any, we know that desires create no "intrinsic value." We can also note that, for example, when something is desired, it has value at least to the person who desires it.
As for the rest, are you talking about the is-ought gap? If so, I suggest you read this recent article.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Oh, gotcha. As it happens, I think every theory of moral realism except for desire utilitarianism would fail the test. For example, theories of ethical non-naturalism have no evidence going for them.
toweltowel
· 9 months ago
I'll reply to both comments here, since this is the only place 'Reply' is showing up.
1. Consider a thoroughgoing antirealism about normativity (what might be called 'nihilism'). Moral properties don't exist, value doesn't exist, reasons for action don't exist, no 'oughts', no 'shoulds'. A normative antirealist could presumably give an entirely empirically successful account of human psychology (including intentional action), invoking beliefs and desires and other psychological states, but never invoking mysterious 'reasons' that ought to be followed or taken into account. Thus I don't see any empirical gain in accepting normative reasons, much less identifying them with desires, since all the empirical work can be done by non-normative psychology.
2. Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. That means only that those who desire x have a certain attitude towards x—a positively evaluating, desiring sort of attitude. And these psychological facts are acceptable to any normative antirealist, to any nihilist.
3. You draw a contrast between desire utilitarianism with ethical non-naturalism. But I think the two views are perfectly compatible, and that their compatibility reveals something important.
An ethical non-naturalist will think that reasons for action are non-natural properties (or perhaps relations) that supervene upon natural properties. But which natural properties constitute the supervenience base, i.e. what is it that gives reasons for action? Well, a non-naturalist is free to say that desires are what constitute the supervenience base, i.e. that desires are what give reasons for actions. And a non-naturalist is similarly free to say that the overall tendency of a desire to fulfill desires is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of goodness, and that an action's being an action which a person with good desires would perform is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of rightness.
So, in general, the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism can be easily accommodated by a non-naturalist metaethic. Of course, a metaethical naturalist could also accept desire utiltiarianism, supplementing the supervenience relations with identity (or constitution or whatever) relations. Indeed, it seems that any metaethical view could accept the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism.
What I think this reveals is that a focus on reasons for action does nothing to dispel the classic metaethical questions. It's just that now the questions are about the nature of reasons for action—are reasons for action non-natural, are they natural, are they nonexistent, or are they the artifact of superficially-descriptive-but-really-expressivist language?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
"For Lisa to not be poisoned, she SHOULD not drink poison." This is a true statement that is not well explained without reference to normative facts. That is different that moral facts, to be sure, but it is a defeater to your point #1.
> Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. <
What else would "normative" mean?
Re: desire utilitarianism and ethical non-naturalism. Desire utilitarianism refers to reasons for action that exist in the natural world: desires. Ethical non-naturalists refer to reasons for action that do not exist in the natural world. (As it happens, ethical non-naturalists also refer to reasons for action that do not exist at all.)
toweltowel
· 9 months ago
1. "'For Lisa to not be poisoned, she SHOULD not drink poison.' This is a true statement that is not well explained without reference to normative facts."
That may or may not be a true statement, but it certainly does not appear to be a statement fit for empirical investigation. Are you perhaps thinking of the causal claim, "Lisa cannot avoid being poisoned if she drinks poison"? This latter claim is indeed empirical, but it is quite different from the above 'should' claim. So there still seems to be no empirical gain in positing normative facts.
2. "What else would 'normative' mean?" Well, something more than a nihilist would accept. And even a nihilist could accept that human animals have attitudes. Normativity is supposed to be something more, about what is appropriate.
3. On "desire utilitarianism", perhaps we are talking past each other. Consider the following two distinct claims:
A: Reasons for actions are grounded entirely in desires, goodness is grounded entirely in a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is grounded entirely in an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.
B: Reasons for action, goodness, and rightness are to be identified with their naturalistic supervenience base.
I thought "desire utilitarianism" referred only to the ethical theory A. And A does not entail the metaethical theory B, and as such is clearly compatible with metaethical non-naturalism.
But I now gather that you use "desire utilitarianism" to refer to the combination of A and B:
C: Reasons for actions are identical with desires, goodness is identical with a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is identical with an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.
That's fine, I suppose, so long as it is recognized that C is a combination of two distinct theories, one ethical and one metaethical. And so the point remains that a desire-based account of reasons of action has no special advantage when it comes to all the old metaethical questions.
P. S. Sorry for posting this reply in a funny place, I'm just clicking the most appropriate 'Reply' I can find.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Yeah, DISQUS is being ridiculous. I'm trying to find a way out without losing all the comments.
About desire utilitarianism, the way I like to say it is that much of the theory is semantic and much of it is ontological. Many parts of the theory are about what people seem to mean when they use moral terms. Other parts of the theory are about what happens if we look for referents to what people mean in the real universe.
For example, when people talk about morality, they seem to be talking about objectively existing reasons for action. That's a semantic issue. Now, what kinds of things are found in the set "reasons for action"? God's will? Categorical imperatives? Intrinsic values? As it happens, the only things in the set that actually exists are desires. That's an ontological claim.
Anyway, I haven't addressed your criticisms very well here, but I will touch on them more thoroughly in later posts. I can't spend all my time responding to comments, or else I won't have any time to write new posts! But I do appreciate you pursuing this discussion as I far as I was able in this thread.
I suppose it feels like I'm running away from your questions, but I'd really like to address these very important objections in full, more carefully prepared blog posts, and that takes some time.
I have a vested interest in answering these questions not so much because I want "my theory" to succeed, but because if I am wrong I don't want to keep wasting my time on desire utilitarianism. So if I keep writing out the answers to these questions and I find a legitimate flaw that cannot be fixed, then I will let go of desire utilitarianism and give a big thanks to everyone who helped point out its flaws.
anselm
· 9 months ago
"No, I mean nothing like that truth is "what works for survival." The mechnisms inside an atomic bomb work because they are true, but they are terrible for survival."
The same mechanisms support the operation of medical CT scans, so in that sense they do "work" for our survival, since our survival-adapted cognitive faculties found them useful. If those faculties ultimately lead to our destruction, then they were maladaptive. But having a brain that "knows" whether the ultimate principles behind those mechanisms are ontologically "true" is irrelevant on evolutionary naturalism.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
What I'm saying is that I have never argued that "true" = what works for survival. If you want to argue for that, fine. If you want to argue against that, I will argue you against it beside you.
anselm
· 9 months ago
Ok, then could you be more specific as to what is meant by "works"; what criteria determines "works" vs. "does not work" and how is it determined whether the criteria have been met?
(Maybe you haven't resolved this yet, since you said you haven't settled on a theory of knowledge. But it seems to me you need to work these issues out before you can go on to how we can "know" right from wrong).
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
A proposition works if the predictions entailed by the proposition turn out to be true when tested, moreso than the predictions of competing propositions about the same subject.
But you're right that I can't defend any theory of knowledge very well right now. I simply observe that science and logic are by far our most reliable methods for truth-gathering, and I can't see any reason to accept thousands of moral propositions as properly basic, nor of course belief in various gods as properly basic.
anselm
· 9 months ago
It seems the term "tested" in your criterion needs to be fleshed out. Does it mean "empirically verified"? (then you have fallen into verificationism). Does it mean "confirmed by the scientific method"? (then you have fallen into scientism).
After posting my question, I did some further reading and realized I had stumbled into a very old issue in philosophy of knowledge, namely "the problem of the criterion." So I'm sure we are sort of reinventing the wheel here from perspective of the professional philosopher--but that's ok, since that is conducive to our learning.
Apparently the two primary solutions to the "problem of the criterion" are "methodism" (not the Christian denomination!), under which one starts the enterprise of knowing with a criterion for what does and does not count as knowledge. The problem is it is subject to a "vicious infinite regress', because how do you know that the criterion itself counts as knowledge?
The other solution is "particularism," under which some types of knowledge are properly basic and are known directly and simply without having to have criteria for how one knows them (e.g., "murder is wrong," "other minds exist", etc.). Of course, I know you reject this.
But until you resolve the issues presented by the criterion of knowledge you present above, I don't see how you can move forward to construct and defend an ethical theory--if you are unsure how knowledge can be attained, then how can you determine whether you have knowledge of what is right and wrong?
(This might be a good question for the "atheist ethicist"--maybe I should post it in the comments on your most recent blog post?)
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
By testing I just mean that we are trying to figure out the truth about moral facts, if there are any moral facts. So far it turns out that philosophical logic and scientific evidence are our best methods for discerning truth. These criteria are, obviously, always subject to revision - what you call a "vicious infinite regress - because we only trust these criteria because they have given us more reliable knowledge than other methods so far.
anselm
· 9 months ago
But since the proposition "philosophical logic and scientific evidence are our best methods for discerning truth" is not arrived at through philosophical logic and scientific evidence, how do you know that proposition is true?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Again, only by observation. I'm not saying this is a metaphysical proposition written into the fabric of the universe. I'm just saying this is an observation of how our universe seems to work, drawing on billions of human experiences throughout history.
anselm
· 9 months ago
Since "scientific evidence" is just a systematized version of "observation and experience," aren't you saying that "I know observation and experience is the test for truth because of observation and experience"? Why isn't that circular?
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
Experience is all we have, inner or outer. You might say that your inner experience (for example, that you talk to God) is validated because you inner experience says it is validated. That's just as circular. There is no non-circular theory of knowledge. Richard Carrier has some thoughts on that here. Carrier thinks that the safest way to end the infinite regress is to end it only with things that literally cannot be untrue: immediate, uninterpreted experience. Perhaps instead you think the infinite regress should end at an arbitrarily chosen set of thousands of basic beliefs about God and moral values and other minds and perhaps other things?
anselm
· 9 months ago
Your link did not work, but that's ok. It seems you are in a classic "pot-kettle" situation when you criticize proper basicality for not having sufficient justification, yet your own criterion for truth is tautological. Or are you now saying your criterion is "properly basic" and withdrawing your previous objections to that concept? And thus that knowledge we apprehend noninferentially and psychologically directly does, indeed, qualify as "knowledge"?
And as a follow-up, what is the source of your confidence that your noetic equipment is trustworthy in translating your immediate experience into truth about fundamental reality?
Here's what I'm saying. There is no theory of knowledge that can escape an infinite regress. Any principle you lay down for justifying your knowledge must itself be justified, which must itself be justified, which must itself be justified...
Here, let's look at it using the language of foundationalism: that the termination of this infinite regress ends in one or more properly basic beliefs, which are used to justify everything else. What I'm saying is that we shouldn't just allow ourselves a whole bunch of properly basic beliefs that may or may not be true (for example, that Shiva exists and lying is always wrong and all kinds of uncertain things). That's pretty reckless to do that.
I'm saying that we should only consider things to be properly basic if it is literally true that they cannot be false. What things cannot be false? Not much. It could be that the hand I hold in front of my face is not really there. It could be that I'm in the Matrix. It could even be that I don't even exist, but that my continuous stream of inner perceptions are continuously created by a Cartesian demon - I could be nothing but a stream of perceptions that is aware of its perceptions.
Wow. So, what is literally undeniable? Descartes tried to say, "I think, therefore I am." Even that was too ambitious. He should have said, "There is a thought, so a thinking thing thinks."
And these are the safest basic beliefs to admit: uninterpreted experience. From there, we build up probabilistic models of reality.
If instead we build our models of reality on a long list of (seemingly arbitrarily chosen) basic beliefs - including belief in other minds, belief in various souls and spirits and such, belief in certain moral values but not other ones - where do we stop? Why the heck should we admit such a long list of beliefs as properly basic, and how would you argue against someone who admits belief in Shiva or belief in murder's moral goodness as properly basic? I don't think you could.
Basically, I think your theory of knowledge is terribly reckless with the truth.
anselm
· 9 months ago
"Basically, I think your theory of knowledge is terribly reckless with the truth."
Ok, and I am saying that your theory of knowledge, which acknowledges it is caught in an infinite regress, has no basis for saying that anything is true, including "uninterpreted experience," and so ends in epistemological nihilism. But since this is your blog, that will be my last salvo on this issue, so feel free to have the last word :)
Sincerely, I appreciate the opportunity for dialog; I know you put a tremendous amount of work into making this forum available and you are doing an excellent job.
lukeprog
· 9 months ago
I'd rather not have the last word. How is your view any less subject to the infinite regress? And why do you think it's wise to admit hundreds and hundreds of propositions as "properly basic", without any grounds for this?
All Comments
What assumptions would you use to evaluate the logic of an ethical theory?
BTW, even if we didn't yet have good premises, etc. to start with, that doesn't mean we should turn to really bad tools. Just like when we had no way to know that lightning was caused by electric charges, that didn't mean "Zeus" was a good answer.
There are two big tasks for someone who wishes to build a moral theory that is true:
1) If it is to be a theory about morality, it must capture what we typically mean when we use moral terms. This is the semantic challenge.
2) The theory must make claims that are actually true about the world, based on good evidence and reason.
If condition (2) is satisfied but not condition (1), then we have a good theory that is true but it just so happens to not be about morality. For example, it might be a true theory about aesthetics, even though we started out trying to build a moral theory.
If condition (1) is satisfied but not condition (2) - which is usually the case - then we have a moral theory but no good reason to think it is true.
As for how desire utilitarianism is semantically true, see here. As for how desire utilitarianism is factually true, see my book.
I don't see how logic can do more than check for internal consistency and if particular actions succeed in serving your overall goals. But you still need overall goals, like promoting happiness and reducing suffering. No matter what your overall goals are - but why? To get overall goals, you still need some kind of a morality/value detector.
Of course to get moral goals you need a way to detect them, but I propose that the way to detect them is with the tools of science, since it appears we do not have an internal morality detector. It would be easier if we did, but it is a fact of the matter that we do not.
You make too much of the differences between cultures and not enough about the similarities. I suggest looking into scientific studies on the similarities before you toss up your hands and say there's no common ground. These are noob mistakes, in my opinion. Common sense says you will fail and unless you want to embrace the magic of Platonism, you'll come back to your senses. Good luck, regardless.
Ben
To say that we "need" an intuitive moral sense to test moral theories is like saying we "need" an intuitive astronomical sense to test astronomical theories.
You seem to be interested in moral theories that are workable - that people cannot actually follow. That's fine. We are then talking about two different things. You are talking about a moral theory that is workable. I am talking about a moral theory that happens to be true. I'm after truth.
Smilansky has argued something similar to your thinking with regard to free will. He says that it's becoming clear that we do not have free will, but such a discovery is not workable in human society. Human society will degenerate if philosophers and nueroscientists tell the common people that they do not have free will. So, we have to lie to the people and tell them that "Everything's okay, we found free will. It exists. You have it. Be good, now."
I don't think society will fall apart with the knowledge that free will does not exist. But let's say I'm wrong. Perhaps we SHOULD lie to people about free will, just because that's more workable. That's a debate worth having.
But, back to morality, that is not the debate I'm having here. I'm arguing about a test for what's true, not about what's workable. Indeed, testing moral theories against our moral intuitions is a decent test for workability. All I said above is that it is not a decent test for truth.
Are you to the part in Sense and Goodness where Carrier lays out his moral theory? Why don't you read that and get back to me. Or you can watch the video here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dce8mE0q4zA
Ben
The question is valid because I don't trust my magical morality detectors. Do you really think we evolved to have a special mental faculty for detecting moral facts? Richard Carrier doesn't think so, either.
"...based not on our feelings, but on what we actually find out there in the universe, and what conforms to logic."
It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. What in the world could you possibly be talking about? A morality that is all logic is just as worthless as one that is all feeling, since there is ultimately no reason to be moral or care about anything. So if you are looking for a logic only morality, I'll save you the trouble. There isn't one nor can there be. Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. I thought I'd save you that cliche' bit of self-deception, but as is you're either going to come up with something that is just as refutable as what you dismiss on your own terms, you'll end in some kind of stupid Dr. Manhattanesque nihilism, or you'll just be really confused and wandering through various ethical theories for a really long time. All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed.
If this isn't a helpful heads up, then pretend like I didn't say anything. ;)
Ben
Why should our moral feelings not be ignored? Do they have something of value to contribute to the question of what exists and what does not? If so, why do you think so? Do our feelings have anything to contribute to our investigation of whether or not germs cause disease, or whether or not the sun in 93 million miles away, or whether or not virtual particles pop into existence uncaused, or whether or not humans are descended from apes, or whether or not water is H2O?
> It is simply absurd and obtuse to "go looking" for morality somewhere out there in the universe. <
Why? Because you concluded a priori that moral values do not exist?
> What in the world could you possibly be talking about? <
Morality talks about objective reasons for action that exist. Perhaps there are some such things that exist, or perhaps there are not. I've come to think there are, but I could be wrong.
> Feelings have to factor in or it's pointless and you *will* factor them in regardless of whether you claim not to be doing so. <
Feelings do not have to factor in to the facts about morality, just as they do not have to factor into the facts about chemistry. They will, of course - until we can make robot scientists - but that doesn't mean they should, if we are looking for truth.
> All this because you can't bring yourself to accept a straight forward balance of emotion and logic where either one can check the other as needed. <
Is this how you treat all other domains of fact, too? Emotions must check the facts about planet formation, or neutrinos, or cosmic expansion? We should test these things against our feelings about them?
What is your basis for saying our evolved "logical sense" is reliable, since its application varies widely across cultures (e.g., in Eastern philosophy where even the law of non-contradiction is denied) and also appears to be unnecessary for survival (witness the countless well-adapted species with no such sense)?
For example, Eastern philosophy rejects the law of noncontradiction, yet it provides Eastern philosophers with the metaphysics that they want--it "works" for them; so is it true for that reason?
"You are talking about a moral theory that is workable. I am talking about a moral theory that happens to be true. I'm after truth."
Doesn't this contradict your definition of truth as what "works"?
"works" is a vague word and I'm using it in two different senses. Let's say we decided that we wanted to know the exact average height of everyone on the planet at 2:32:00pm PST on May 13, 2011. We know certain methods of measuring height that "work", and in measuring we would be making lots of assumptions about what exists in the universe because those assumptions "work." But this plan to apply all these bits of knowledge to measure the exact average height humanity is unworkable, even though it depends on real knowledge (that "works") about things like height and sight and human anatomy and measurement and maths.
In ancient Japan a samurai could kill a commoner any time he wanted, we'd call that murder. In what way were the samurai wrong? There is no way to make that claim unless you first make an assumption; that all life is precious or that we must treat other's as we expect to be treated, etc. But those are a priory moral assumptions based on your Western Christian upbringing.
What would be the logical reasons why a samurai killing a peasant who offended him be wrong? That he destroyed his shogun's property without permission? Is that really moral?
Face it, you would find logical reasons why what those ancient samurai's did was wrong based on the feelings you have from your upbringing.
> In ancient Japan a samurai could kill a commoner any time he wanted, we'd call that murder. In what way were the samurai wrong? There is no way to make that claim unless you first make an assumption; that all life is precious or that we must treat other's as we expect to be treated, etc. <
No, that's not the only way to claim the samurai is wrong. For example, desire utilitarianism would argue that the samurai's action was morally wrong, but desire utilitarianism does not claim that life is precious or that treating others as we want to be treated is a principle with intrinsic value.
It seems we probably agree that moral theories must be evaluated on grounds of evidence and logic, but you just happen to think there are no such things as moral values. I think that is a respectable position. At the moment I am persuaded otherwise, but I could easily be wrong.
In the samurai example above both you and I immediately and without question, took the position that the samurai was wrong to kill peasants like that, then we looked for logical reasons why it was wrong. We would have to start out in neutral then use logic and reason to discover if he was right or wrong.
I will admit that the very idea of possibly condoning that kind of behavior upsets me.
However, I don't disagree with what you are trying to do. Reason and logic do need to be applied to moral and ethical standards otherwise we are just blinding following what our culture taught us.
But we also have to admit that we start from a biased position and can't do anything else.
Let me explain. Given a situation that requires a decision (why label any decisions as moral?) if we are logical we will evaluate the outcomes and rank them according to criteria. But the criteria we choose pre-selects the outcome as preferred. So we need to step back to the criteria which we will apply.
Logically those criteria should be for our greatest benefit – anything else is irrational. If I skip a few steps in the reasoning you will fill them in and … so by and large we get to ‘to might is right’.
This is the basis of our survival as an evolutionary species and is the rational end point of logic based morality.
Any morality which dilutes our ability to procreate is contra to evolutionary need. There is evidence that sociopathic tendencies are dominant rather than recessive in the gene pool – for this very reason? The concept that we are all better off if society is better off is a demonstrable nonsense. Small group survival to the exclusion of other groups is the best guarantee of access to resources. Lots of consumers for the global corporates is a short term win for the “personality” of the corporates – they know that they are depleting resources (not theirs – that of others initially). (As an aside - Interesting to view corporate behaviour as that of “persons”, it then makes a lot of sense = Organisational Dynamics as a behaviour science)
It is the common thread of the worlds’ major religions' teachings (include the apparently non-theist ones too … they provide for some form of life after) that provides the only input to the moral debate that is not entirely self serving. The ‘do to others … love your neighbour’ style golden rule is setting oneself up to be vulnerable – one could argue that it is the logical teaching of those who have no intention of following it.
If you want morality you have to look to the spiritual dimension - sorry about that.
Sala kahle -peace
First off, in some cases it seems to contradict what one's feelings might say about morality. That may be okay, but wouldn't these feelings at least give us a general guide of what we could consider right and wrong? Perhaps it's a bit too vague. But desire utilitarianism would seem to say that if we lived in a world where everyone desired to be raped or stolen from, then it would be right to do so. I know that logically that might be the case, but something about it still offends my moral feelings about the matter. A visitor to the hypothetical world from this one would view everyone there as insane. Indeed, if a person desired that in this world, we would probably say they needed a good psychiatrist. So why is it wrong to murder a person who wants to be murdered when it is just one individual, but right to murder them when the entire population feels that way? And at what point along that continuum does it go from being wrong to right?
Another point to make - and this might just be a case of misunderstanding - is the idea of evaluating desires. At one point you say that "The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire. A person with good desires would not torture children, so torturing children is a wrong action to perform." My question is what more and greater desires are you considering here? We have 20 sadists who desire to torture a child, versus one child who desires not to be tortured. How does one evaluate which desires take precedence over others, especially when we cannot use our moral intuitions on the matter? And such a calculation seems as impossible as a good utilitarian "hedonic calculus" problem - how do we evaluate a complex moral problem when we must take into consideration everyone's desires, possible desires (because we can't know for sure what they want), etc.? Perhaps such a moral framework is not practical.
At any rate, perhaps what I've said is based on a misunderstanding of your eBook, so maybe you could clarify if I went wrong somewhere? Let me say once again that I certainly enjoyed it, and I recognize the problem with finding "goodness" and "badness" in the physical world. Cheers!
Thanks for your interest.
Yes, desire utilitarianism goes against one's feelings. I don't think that's a problem. Many scientific facts have contradicted our feelings. But do we trust our feelings, or the facts? If there are moral facts, it should not be surprising at all that they contradict our feelings.
{ So why is it wrong to murder a person who wants to be murdered when it is just one individual, but right to murder them when the entire population feels that way? And at what point along that continuum does it go from being wrong to right? }
Excellent question.
First, I did not say that it is wrong to kill a person who wants to be killed. We must consider all desires. Would this thwart the desires of this person's family and friends? Would it thwart other desires? In general, would the decision to kill those who want to be killed tend to thwart more desires than it fulfills? These are tough questions to answer, but those would be things to look into. I don't think I know the answer to that question, but the question can (in theory) be answered if we do enough research.
{ My question is what more and greater desires are you considering here? We have 20 sadists who desire to torture a child, versus one child who desires not to be tortured. How does one evaluate which desires take precedence over others, especially when we cannot use our moral intuitions on the matter? }
I explain this in that same chapter of my book. Think of the analogy of the knobs.
{ Perhaps such a moral framework is not practical. }
It's difficult to measure desires across the whole world, obviously. That doesn't make the claims of the theory incorrect at all. It merely makes the theory difficult to apply. This is true of many scientific theories.
I suppose this is the one point where perhaps I'm not clear about it. I understand the whole knobs analogy - increasing or decreasing the desire to torture children throughout society - but you conclude that the best place to set the knob is at zero. But I suppose I'm a little unclear as to how you decided this. Let's use the example of the population of 20 sadists and one child that you give. For simplicity's sake, let's just say that these people are the only ones in the world. So we have 20 people who strongly desire to torture a child and only one child who desires not to be tortured. You conclude that "The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater
desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire." But what that says to me is that IF the desire to torture children was strong enough (let's give it a really high value of 10,000), it could outweigh all of the child's desires to not be tortured (100), to grow up (15), to sleep properly (25), etc. These are arbitrary numbers, but if I'm understanding the theory correctly, these values would mean that the desire to torture children is a GOOD desire because it tends to fulfill more and stronger desires than it thwarts. In this case, the torturers are right to torture the child, and indeed the moral thing for the child to do is to accept the torture. We should set the knob at 100%.
Am I misunderstanding the theory, or is that how the "calculation" would really work?
The reason I recommend logic and evidence is that we already know they are our best methods for gaining reliable knowledge. If moral facts do not exist, well then no method can find them. If moral facts do exist, we should use our most trusted knowledge-gathering tools to discover them.
On what grounds would you recommend a spiritual question for morality? Spiritual methods have an awful track record of uncovering facts.
1) In all of your examples of what "works," I'm not clear on why there is a distinction between that and "what is useful to human beings" (predicting physical events, building machines, etc.). Are you saying you consider "what is useful" to be equivalent to "what is true?" In that case, believing that 2 + 2 = 4 is true because it is useful in performing engineering tasks, and believing "free will exists" is true because it is useful in preventing society from degenerating (assuming that would occur if the concept of free will was rejected).
2) Perhaps you could explain the difference between your view and logical positivism, because thus far they appear identical (based on my reading regarding logical positivism, which I admit is not tremendously extensive). Thanks.
2) I am influenced by logical positivism, but have never adhered to verificationism, and am quite aware of the criticisms of logical positivism. I have not yet settled on a comprehensive theory of knowledge.
Let me use standard terms instead. I'm suggesting a pragmatic theory of truth. But again, I haven't settled on a theory of knowledge yet, so I'm not prepared to defend that very well! But I don't see any reason to think we have a sensus divinitatus, or to think that claims about moral facts can be justified without any reasons given.
"Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive … . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."
In that case, "truth" could best be redefined as "what serves the purpose of our survival" (as opposed to "what reflects fundamental reality"). I think pragmatists like Richard Rorty have grasped the implications of this in a profound way, we caused him to reject "objective truth" in favor of "intersubjective truth" (see http://tinyurl.com/4u6cz).
After all, I know of nothing observable by empirical means or required by logic that recommends happiness as superior to misery. Or the satisfaction of desires as superior to the frustration of desires. Or kindness as superior to cruelty.
To put it another way, I would think that every ethical theory—no matter how implausible (e.g., the anti-utilitarian one that says to maximize overall misery)—would pass these tests. Which means these tests couldn't actually function as tests.
To see why I think one ethical theory passes these tests but not any others, see my ethics book linked in the sidebar.
Surely if I'm right about this (it's an old Humean view), then the tests are not actually tests.
How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say that human desires do not count as reasons for action, that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing, and that what is desired need not be valuable at all? This appears to be a logically consistent and empirically unproblematic way of mapping the normative realm of reasons and value onto the descriptive realm of desires and actions. So I don't see how empirical observation and logic could have anything to say about it.
Re: "How can empirical observation and logic rule out ethical theories which say... that the satisfaction of desires is not a good thing...?" Well, "good" means we have objective reasons for action to do something - so either there are objective reasons for action that exist or there are not. That's an empirical question, as noted above.
And how can reason and evidence weigh on the question of what is desired having value? We can, for example, search the world for intrinsic value. Not finding any, we know that desires create no "intrinsic value." We can also note that, for example, when something is desired, it has value at least to the person who desires it.
As for the rest, are you talking about the is-ought gap? If so, I suggest you read this recent article.
1. Consider a thoroughgoing antirealism about normativity (what might be called 'nihilism'). Moral properties don't exist, value doesn't exist, reasons for action don't exist, no 'oughts', no 'shoulds'. A normative antirealist could presumably give an entirely empirically successful account of human psychology (including intentional action), invoking beliefs and desires and other psychological states, but never invoking mysterious 'reasons' that ought to be followed or taken into account. Thus I don't see any empirical gain in accepting normative reasons, much less identifying them with desires, since all the empirical work can be done by non-normative psychology.
2. Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. That means only that those who desire x have a certain attitude towards x—a positively evaluating, desiring sort of attitude. And these psychological facts are acceptable to any normative antirealist, to any nihilist.
3. You draw a contrast between desire utilitarianism with ethical non-naturalism. But I think the two views are perfectly compatible, and that their compatibility reveals something important.
An ethical non-naturalist will think that reasons for action are non-natural properties (or perhaps relations) that supervene upon natural properties. But which natural properties constitute the supervenience base, i.e. what is it that gives reasons for action? Well, a non-naturalist is free to say that desires are what constitute the supervenience base, i.e. that desires are what give reasons for actions. And a non-naturalist is similarly free to say that the overall tendency of a desire to fulfill desires is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of goodness, and that an action's being an action which a person with good desires would perform is what makes it instantiate the non-natural property of rightness.
So, in general, the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism can be easily accommodated by a non-naturalist metaethic. Of course, a metaethical naturalist could also accept desire utiltiarianism, supplementing the supervenience relations with identity (or constitution or whatever) relations. Indeed, it seems that any metaethical view could accept the ethical theory of desire utilitarianism.
What I think this reveals is that a focus on reasons for action does nothing to dispel the classic metaethical questions. It's just that now the questions are about the nature of reasons for action—are reasons for action non-natural, are they natural, are they nonexistent, or are they the artifact of superficially-descriptive-but-really-expressivist language?
> Nothing normative, I think, follows from the fact that something 'has value' for those who desire it. <
What else would "normative" mean?
Re: desire utilitarianism and ethical non-naturalism. Desire utilitarianism refers to reasons for action that exist in the natural world: desires. Ethical non-naturalists refer to reasons for action that do not exist in the natural world. (As it happens, ethical non-naturalists also refer to reasons for action that do not exist at all.)
That may or may not be a true statement, but it certainly does not appear to be a statement fit for empirical investigation. Are you perhaps thinking of the causal claim, "Lisa cannot avoid being poisoned if she drinks poison"? This latter claim is indeed empirical, but it is quite different from the above 'should' claim. So there still seems to be no empirical gain in positing normative facts.
2. "What else would 'normative' mean?" Well, something more than a nihilist would accept. And even a nihilist could accept that human animals have attitudes. Normativity is supposed to be something more, about what is appropriate.
3. On "desire utilitarianism", perhaps we are talking past each other. Consider the following two distinct claims:
A: Reasons for actions are grounded entirely in desires, goodness is grounded entirely in a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is grounded entirely in an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.
B: Reasons for action, goodness, and rightness are to be identified with their naturalistic supervenience base.
I thought "desire utilitarianism" referred only to the ethical theory A. And A does not entail the metaethical theory B, and as such is clearly compatible with metaethical non-naturalism.
But I now gather that you use "desire utilitarianism" to refer to the combination of A and B:
C: Reasons for actions are identical with desires, goodness is identical with a desire's overall tendency to fulfill desires, rightness is identical with an action's being that which a person with good desires would perform.
That's fine, I suppose, so long as it is recognized that C is a combination of two distinct theories, one ethical and one metaethical. And so the point remains that a desire-based account of reasons of action has no special advantage when it comes to all the old metaethical questions.
P. S. Sorry for posting this reply in a funny place, I'm just clicking the most appropriate 'Reply' I can find.
About desire utilitarianism, the way I like to say it is that much of the theory is semantic and much of it is ontological. Many parts of the theory are about what people seem to mean when they use moral terms. Other parts of the theory are about what happens if we look for referents to what people mean in the real universe.
For example, when people talk about morality, they seem to be talking about objectively existing reasons for action. That's a semantic issue. Now, what kinds of things are found in the set "reasons for action"? God's will? Categorical imperatives? Intrinsic values? As it happens, the only things in the set that actually exists are desires. That's an ontological claim.
Anyway, I haven't addressed your criticisms very well here, but I will touch on them more thoroughly in later posts. I can't spend all my time responding to comments, or else I won't have any time to write new posts! But I do appreciate you pursuing this discussion as I far as I was able in this thread.
I suppose it feels like I'm running away from your questions, but I'd really like to address these very important objections in full, more carefully prepared blog posts, and that takes some time.
I have a vested interest in answering these questions not so much because I want "my theory" to succeed, but because if I am wrong I don't want to keep wasting my time on desire utilitarianism. So if I keep writing out the answers to these questions and I find a legitimate flaw that cannot be fixed, then I will let go of desire utilitarianism and give a big thanks to everyone who helped point out its flaws.
The same mechanisms support the operation of medical CT scans, so in that sense they do "work" for our survival, since our survival-adapted cognitive faculties found them useful. If those faculties ultimately lead to our destruction, then they were maladaptive. But having a brain that "knows" whether the ultimate principles behind those mechanisms are ontologically "true" is irrelevant on evolutionary naturalism.
(Maybe you haven't resolved this yet, since you said you haven't settled on a theory of knowledge. But it seems to me you need to work these issues out before you can go on to how we can "know" right from wrong).
But you're right that I can't defend any theory of knowledge very well right now. I simply observe that science and logic are by far our most reliable methods for truth-gathering, and I can't see any reason to accept thousands of moral propositions as properly basic, nor of course belief in various gods as properly basic.
After posting my question, I did some further reading and realized I had stumbled into a very old issue in philosophy of knowledge, namely "the problem of the criterion." So I'm sure we are sort of reinventing the wheel here from perspective of the professional philosopher--but that's ok, since that is conducive to our learning.
Apparently the two primary solutions to the "problem of the criterion" are "methodism" (not the Christian denomination!), under which one starts the enterprise of knowing with a criterion for what does and does not count as knowledge. The problem is it is subject to a "vicious infinite regress', because how do you know that the criterion itself counts as knowledge?
The other solution is "particularism," under which some types of knowledge are properly basic and are known directly and simply without having to have criteria for how one knows them (e.g., "murder is wrong," "other minds exist", etc.). Of course, I know you reject this.
But until you resolve the issues presented by the criterion of knowledge you present above, I don't see how you can move forward to construct and defend an ethical theory--if you are unsure how knowledge can be attained, then how can you determine whether you have knowledge of what is right and wrong?
(This might be a good question for the "atheist ethicist"--maybe I should post it in the comments on your most recent blog post?)
And as a follow-up, what is the source of your confidence that your noetic equipment is trustworthy in translating your immediate experience into truth about fundamental reality?
Here's what I'm saying. There is no theory of knowledge that can escape an infinite regress. Any principle you lay down for justifying your knowledge must itself be justified, which must itself be justified, which must itself be justified...
Here, let's look at it using the language of foundationalism: that the termination of this infinite regress ends in one or more properly basic beliefs, which are used to justify everything else. What I'm saying is that we shouldn't just allow ourselves a whole bunch of properly basic beliefs that may or may not be true (for example, that Shiva exists and lying is always wrong and all kinds of uncertain things). That's pretty reckless to do that.
I'm saying that we should only consider things to be properly basic if it is literally true that they cannot be false. What things cannot be false? Not much. It could be that the hand I hold in front of my face is not really there. It could be that I'm in the Matrix. It could even be that I don't even exist, but that my continuous stream of inner perceptions are continuously created by a Cartesian demon - I could be nothing but a stream of perceptions that is aware of its perceptions.
Wow. So, what is literally undeniable? Descartes tried to say, "I think, therefore I am." Even that was too ambitious. He should have said, "There is a thought, so a thinking thing thinks."
And these are the safest basic beliefs to admit: uninterpreted experience. From there, we build up probabilistic models of reality.
If instead we build our models of reality on a long list of (seemingly arbitrarily chosen) basic beliefs - including belief in other minds, belief in various souls and spirits and such, belief in certain moral values but not other ones - where do we stop? Why the heck should we admit such a long list of beliefs as properly basic, and how would you argue against someone who admits belief in Shiva or belief in murder's moral goodness as properly basic? I don't think you could.
Basically, I think your theory of knowledge is terribly reckless with the truth.
Ok, and I am saying that your theory of knowledge, which acknowledges it is caught in an infinite regress, has no basis for saying that anything is true, including "uninterpreted experience," and so ends in epistemological nihilism. But since this is your blog, that will be my last salvo on this issue, so feel free to have the last word :)
Sincerely, I appreciate the opportunity for dialog; I know you put a tremendous amount of work into making this forum available and you are doing an excellent job.