Common Sense Atheism - Latest Comments in Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Tue, 31 Mar 2009 10:31:33 -0000

Yeah, this is Plantinga's argument. But has he given this argument for the direct apprehension of moral values? To my knowledge he only proposed the sensus divinitatus as a faculty for directly perceiving God. But I haven't read every word Plantinga has ever wrote.

One problem with all this is that we do not have a sensus divinitatus, any more than we have a sensus moralitatus or sense implanted by the Flying Spaghetti Monster for directly sensing him.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Tue, 31 Mar 2009 08:59:02 -0000

It occurs to me that an explanatory addendum to this discussion would be useful for those of your readers who don't have time to read all the links provided in a comment (I can sympathize with them, since I often don't have such time myself--and since this thread is already so long, why not?)

Under the theory of proper basicality, epistemically noninferential beliefs such as our apprehension of objective moral values have "warrant" to the extent that they are formed by cognitive faculties functioning properly, i.e., as God designed them to. On theism, our cognitive faculties are constructed by their designer according to a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs, including true beliefs regarding the moral values that inhere in God's nature as an all-good being (see the ontological argument) and which we experience noninferentially and psychologically directly as moral imperatives. God, as the supreme knower and locus of both moral standards and moral knowledge, has created us in his image, an important part of which involves giving us what is needed to have moral knowledge, as he does.

Conversely, on atheistic naturalism, our cognitive faculties are aimed at survival, not truth, so we can have no confidence in their deliverances (including their deliverances in regard to our construction of moral and ethical theory, e.g., "desire utilitarianism"). Indeed, on atheism, none of our beliefs have warrant because atheism presupposes that the faculties that produce our beliefs are adapted only for survival--any overlap with truth-attainment would be coincidental (but that gets into the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, which perhaps you will post on in the future).

I'm sure you are already familiar with the above, but wanted to provide it for any readers who were not. Thanks.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 23:19:30 -0000

Fair enough, I'm glad you critically evaluate what you read. Some questions that still haven't been answered:

1) Why is "Rape is wrong" properly basic but not "Shiva exists"?

2) What makes something qualify as a properly basic belief?

3) Why should we think that common or universal assumptions need no justification, especially since so many common assumptions have been overturned by modern science?

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 22:49:54 -0000

I assure you I only quote arguments that I have evaluated and agree with. In another comment I sincerely compliment you on being "eerily prolific"; however, I'm afraid I am doing well to read widely and evaluate critically what I read; I don't have time to come up with my own epistemology from scratch.

However, in my view you making an unrealistic demand of the notion of "proper basicality." As C.S. Lewis noted in "The Abolition of Man" the notion of the Tao, or the moral law, is part of the common, human moral experience, just as is our belief that others we interact with have minds and are not cleverly constructed androids (although there is no way we could ever prove otherwise). Perhaps you do not share the same immediate apprehension of moral revulsion against rape, etc., in a noninferential way--i.e., you believe you must go through a deductive reasoning process to justify your revulsion. That's fine; if so we have hit an impasse. But I believe third party readers of this exchange (please tell me you have a lot of readers and that there is an audience for this time-consuming--though enjoyable--exchange!) will recognize the internal veridicality of their sense of objective moral values and be able to distinguish that sense from subjective opinions/matters of taste. Thanks.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 22:17:18 -0000

I did it the easy way and passed it off to Alonzo. Obviously, he explains his theory much better than I do. Here is the answer.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 22:06:54 -0000

I knew it would cause confusion, but I use the term "common sense" in a specific way on this blog, as explained in my introductory post. I mean that one should apply the same type of reasoning to religious ideas as they do to everything else. They should apply their "common" sense to religious ideas, not a "special" way of thinking reserved for justifying whatever they want to justify. When you eliminate double standards from your thinking, this results in atheism. That is what I mean by "common sense atheism."

I certainly do not mean that atheism is common sense in that this is the way most people think. Most people are not atheists. I don't have much respect for that kind of common sense, the common sense that the sun goes around the earth or that we have a sixth sense for directly detecting moral values. This blog does not promote that kind of common sense, but consistency is thinking. Perhaps I should have called it "No Double Standards", but that was taken.

I disagree strongly with Brink and Martin who assert that objective moral realism has no burden of proof simply because it is what our ignorant ancestors assumed. I also disagree with you that objective moral values are known through properly basic beliefs.

I do have upcoming posts on Plantinga and also on foundationalism vs. coherentism, etc. What I'd like to focus on right now is that you have no good reasons to think that "rape is wrong" is a properly basic belief, any more than you have reason to think that "homosexuality is wrong" is a properly basic belief.

In addition to your inability to explain why "rape is wrong" counts as a properly basic belief (but not a billion other possible basic beliefs, like "Vishnu is god"), I would like to point out that even assuming proper basicality does not provide you with an account of objective moral values anything like what you'd want. Either you must assume that all moral facts (relating to an infinite number of propositions and their rightness/wrongness) are properly basic (including, say, "eating cheese on Sundays is morally permissable), or else you must claim that the objective moral value of all other actions can be derived from those which are properly basic. But I see no mechanism to do so. Even if one assumes, say, 500 properly basic beliefs about the moral value of 500 particular actions, how can all the other moral facts be deduced from those taken as properly basic?

anselm, I could be wrong, but it seems to me you are taking Plantinga and Craig at their word without really thinking about what they are saying. You assume they must have a good argument for why "rape is wrong" can be properly basic but "Shiva is god" cannot. But as it turns out, Plantinga and Craig do not have good answers to this question, and I suspect you do not, either.

I do appreciate your prolific quotes, as they point to further sources of reading, but I am not persuaded by quoting other people who give bad arguments (Plantinga and Craig and Martin). I am only persuaded if you give a good argument.

I have given an argument for why objective moral values can be derived from reasons for action that exist (aka, without God). I have defended that argument against all attacks so far (with some pending replies).

You have not given an argument for why we should think that "rape is wrong" is properly basic, whereas a billion other possible basic beliefs (for example, "killing in wartime is wrong" or "Shiva is God") are not properly basic.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 20:54:14 -0000

As I'm sure you are aware (since it is typically discussed in introductory philosophy texts--see http://tinyurl.com/c9549n) the concept of proper basicality is key not just to reformed epistemology, but foundationalism (e.g. Thomas Reid, etc.). Not all beliefs need to be justified with evidence, since some are foundational to rational discourse itself. I hope you do not reject that principle, since if so you are flirting not just with skepticism, but solipsism.

If you have a refutation of Plantinga's argument, for example, in God and Other Minds that our belief in other minds can be evidentially justified and need not be considered properly basic, I would love to see it (might make a good topic for a future major post). Plantinga's reasoning there can also be applied to objective moral values, as indicated in the Copan text I linked to above. Our understanding that murder, rape and incest are wrong are epistemically noninferential and psychologically direct. If you choose to embrace (as you did in your comment above) the bizarre and counterintuitive position that murder, rape and incest can be morally acceptable, the burden is on you to demonstrate that and provide a defeater for our common moral experience.

As atheist Michael Martin has put it, "common sense assumes that morality is objective" (Morality and Meaning, p. 12). Since this blog bills itself as a paragon of "common sense," I hope readers will see the merit Martin's quote.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 19:17:21 -0000

I know you are asserting that belief in objective moral values is properly basic. But you've not argued as for why we should suspect that "the act of rape is wrong" is properly basic. Why is that properly basic, but not belief in a Giant Pumpkin, or belief that rape is right, or belief that psychic powers exist? Without an argument, you might as well assert anything you want to believe is properly basic, and therefore does not require justification.

Plantinga's two major arguments of reformed epistemology are the last retreat of theism. Lacking any ability to rationally justify itself, theism must say that it needs no rational justification because it's "just so."

And now you're doing the same for your belief in objective moral values.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 18:12:06 -0000

As I've said before, I certainly don't expect to change your mind, since that rarely happens in exchanges like these, but undecided third parties who are reading this may find the discussion helpful as they weigh the issues.

I assume you are familiar with the concept of "proper basicality"? It applies to our knowledge of objective moral values. Not all knowledge comes through the process of deduction or empirical investigation, and our knowledge of objective moral values falls into that category--see http://tinyurl.com/cyr36d

as does our belief in other minds (see http://tinyurl.com/d94orh).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 17:04:14 -0000

Again, I see assertions, not arguments. Why should we suspect that there are moral truths that we know merely because we feel that we know them? There is nothing logically necessary about "rape is wrong" in the way that "2+2=4" is logically necessary. And in fact, there are several cultures in which rape is right under certain circumstances, murder is acceptable under certain circumstances. And of course there are many in which incest was acceptable. But there is no culture in which 2+2=5. The equation 2+2=4 is true by definition. Not so of moral claims. They are empirical claims: that there exists a property called "wrongness" and that the act of rape somehow possesses this property in all circumstances. If you want me to accept such an ambitious positive claim, I'm going to need an argument, not merely the assertion that "It's obvious! How can you not know that?"

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 16:06:09 -0000

No, not because we feel it is wrong, but because we know it is wrong. As J. Budziszewski has said, there are certain moral truths that "we can't not know" (see http://tinyurl.com/c4wt6b). Or as Craig has argued (as I pointed out in a thread on another post):

"The way in which moral theorists test competing ethical theories is by assessing how well they cohere with our moral experience. I take it that in moral experience we do apprehend an realm of objective moral values and duties, just as in sensory experience we apprehend a realm of objectively existing physical objects. Just as it is impossible for us to get outside our sensory input to test its veridicality, so there is no way to test independently the veridicality of our moral perceptions. As Sorley emphasized, there is no more reason to deny the objective reality of moral values than the objective reality of the physical world. In the absence of some defeater, we rationally trust our perceptions, whether sensory or moral...Most of us think that in moral experience we do apprehend objective values and obligations. Ruse himself confesses in another context, 'The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says 2+2 = 5.' (see "Reasonable Faith, 3rd ed).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 14:10:10 -0000

But why is incest wrong in all possible worlds? What is your argument? Is you argument "because it feels wrong!" ?

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 08:53:06 -0000

As is to be expected, when the discussion gets down to a dispute over first principles we will have to agree to disagree, but suffice it to say that in my view, any ethical system that allows for the possibility that parent-child incest is morally acceptable has a serious flaw and needs to be rethought. But I appreciate the discussion; this blog functions well as a sort of "free graduate seminar." (And you might consider applying to some philosophy Ph.D programs--although I realize that the academic job market in the humanities is not the best).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 21:37:12 -0000

It seems to me that for you the terms "objective" and "universal" actually mean "necessary".

To me, "universal morality" refers to moral principles that are morally binding on all moral agents. On that definition, desire utilitarianism is a theory of universal morality.

I have no doubt that many people would say incest is morally wrong in all possible worlds. I think they are wrong. Probably, they could not even give a coherent argument as to why this is so.

Is feeding shit to your own children morally wrong in a universe in which shit is the most nourishing and tasty thing for humans to consume? Why? Because you feel it to be wrong? Or because you have a "sixth sense" that has been demonstrated to accurately perceive a Platonic realm of perfect moral values that includes on against feeding shit to your children?

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 21:02:30 -0000

Hmm, well I guess we also have different definitions of "universal", since if incest is morally good or morally bad depending on the particular configuration of desires among a particular configuration of human beings then its moral status would appear to be "particular" and not "universal." I would submit, however, that sexual relations between a parent and child is always morally wrong regardless of whether it fulfills more desires than it thwarts (just as 2 +2 always equals 4). And I would venture that you would find very, very few people who would disagree with me (because of their apprehension of what Craig calls "an objective realm of moral values").

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 20:33:57 -0000

I guess we have different ideas about the traditional definitions of these words. To me, "objective" mean "true independent of opinion." For example, scientific truths are objectively true. But scientific truths are not necessarily true. No, they are thoroughly contingent.

In any case, it doesn't matter what label you use to describe my ethical theory. It is "subjectivist" by your definition but claims that there are universal moral facts.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 20:23:34 -0000

Like I said, the ability to call desire utilitarianism a system of "objective" morality depends on redefining the word "objective." 2 + 2 = 4 is not a contingent, but a necessary truth. If moral values is only contingently, and not necessarily true, they are not objective (in the traditional sense of the word).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 20:05:31 -0000

See the answers to the questions about subjective vs. objective above. Or, here's the relevant section from my book:

You might think I’m saying that morality is subjective, since “good” and “bad” depend on whatever people happen to desire. This comes from a confusion about what the words “subjective” and “objective” mean.
Morality does depend on desires. If there were no desires, there would be no moral value in the universe. And if everybody desired to be surrounded by deafening noise, then it would be morally right to carry a blasting boombox everywhere you went. In this sense, morality is subjective.

But that’s not what most people mean by “subjective.” Subjective morality usually means that each of us gets to choose for ourselves what is good and bad, and nobody can be wrong. Morality is not subjective in this sense. As we saw before, you are objectively wrong if you claim that “rape is good.” Why? Because rape is an action that a person with good desires would not perform. Instead, rape comes from a bad desire; a desire that tends to thwart more and greater desires than it tends to fulfill. Since desires are the only reasons for action that exist, we have real and universal reason for actions to diminish or eliminate the desire to rape in others.

Also, consider the word “objective.” Some people use the phrase “objective morality” to refer to some kind of intrinsic value written into the fabric of the universe. But intrinsic value doesn’t exist. In this sense, objective morality doesn’t exist.

But that’s not what most people mean by “objective.” Objective morality usually means that moral statements can be true or false in the same way that scientific statements can be true or false. In this sense, morality is objective, as we saw above.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 18:54:07 -0000

Thanks, that's helpful (as are the FAQs). However, it is clear to me that "desire utilitarianism" does not support "objective moral values" in any generally or traditionally accepted use of the term "objective." If values are dependent on the contingent mental states of contingent beings, they are not objectively grounded. (Of course, since atheists are not concerned about "objectivity" as traditionally conceived, this will likely not concern them, except to the extent that any attempt to come up with a "grand unified theory" of atheist ethics is bound to fail, which is why there are a such myriad of conflicting naturalistic ethical theories).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 16:54:58 -0000

Why not plug into a Matrix that satiates desires? Because moral value comes from desire fulfillment, not desire satiation. See the FAQ above re:

Why desire “fulfillment” instead of desire “satisfaction”?

and

Aren’t you just saying that desire fulfillment has intrinsic value, that we should do whatever fulfills the most desires?

As for the incest scenario. If we assume a particular universe in which the desire for incest tends to fulfill more desires than are thwarted, then yes the desire for incest is a morally good desire in that universe.

Likewise, if our universe was such that eating our own shit tended to fulfill more desires than were thwarted, then the desire to eat shit would be a morally good desire, and it would be morally good to feed shit to our children. It just so happens that is not true of our universe.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 16:49:34 -0000

No, it's not an arbitrary choice any more than weighing water by accounting for both its volume and its density is an arbitrary choice. That's just how much there is.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

anselm — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 13:03:17 -0000

The problem with your response to the matrix thought experiment is that from the perspective of the person "plugged in" to the matrix, there is no difference between his matrix experiences and the identical experience "in the world" that changes a "state of affairs." So why make an arbitrary distinction that one is "bad" and the other "good" since they do an identical job of satiating desires?

The problem with your response to the incest thought experiment is that it depends on offspring being produced; what if it could be arranged that none would be through use of contraception? (Since this is a thought experiment, we can assume that technology has provided a foolproof form of contraception).

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

Richard — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 12:51:51 -0000

OK, thanks. I'll try to be patient. ;)

In the meantime, let me address one point from above. You wrote:

My claim is that the only reasons for action that happen to exist in the universe are the relations between desires and states of affairs. There is certainly no reason to count some desires as more important than others, except when they are literally "greater" - for example when my desire to get laid tonight is greater than my desire for ice cream tonight. So, in our moral calculus we count up all the desires (in any thing capable of having desires), measure their strengths, and ask: "Which desires will tend to fulfill the most desires, and which desires will tend to thwart the most desires?"

But you've still made an unjustified choice. The fact that there is no reason to count some people's desires as more important than other people's doesn't mean there is a reason to count all people's desires as equally important. There is no reason to choose either alternative.

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

lukeprog — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 11:06:16 -0000

No, I get it. I said above I'm writing a whole post about this important issue. Please be patient. :)

Re: Questions about ‘What Is Morality?’

Richard — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 06:19:42 -0000

Luke. Your responses to my objections hinge on your phrase "there are reasons for action that exist such that...". Further up the thread, I asked you to clarify what you mean by this. Instead of doing so, you referred me to several web pages discussing various possible meanings. But I need to know which meaning you have in mind.

Above I offered two interpretations:

1. There are reasons why people do act such that...
2. There are reasons why people should act such that...

The distinction I'm attempting to make is between explanatory reasons and justifying reasons. Which do you mean?